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I INTRODUCTION 
A The Impact of Process and Culture on Negotiation 
In the modern, post-colonial state, there is growing acknowledgement of the ambivalent 
status occupied by indigenous peoples, both historically and in the present. A negotiation 
industry has sprung up around the attempts of governments and indigenous peoples to 
resolve outstanding disputes. This has been the case in New Zealand where negotiations 
are taking place between the Crown and Maori. 1 At the time of writing, two major 
settlements have been reached through negotiation: the Fisheries settlement2 and Tainui 
settlement.3 Two further large scale negotiations are on the agenda between the 
Government and the Taranaki and Ngai Tahu iwi. There are numerous issues coming out. 
of these negotiations which require further analysis if Crown and Maori negotiations are 
to be worthwhile and lasting. 
Against the backdrop of negotiations between the Crown and Maori, the discussion in this 
paper involves two concepts. The concept of fundamental importance in this paper is the 
process of negotiation. The goal of this paper is to determine what guidelines can be 
2 
3 
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The 'Crown" Is part of the executive arm of government In New Zealand. The Government 
represents the Crown 1n all respects. The term 'Maori' Is used along with '!wt" and "hapil" 1n this 
paper. It Is now generally accepted that lwl and hapil are the appropriate groups for the Crown 
to deal with. For comment on U1e mana motuhake (autonomy) of lwl and hapil. see W Dewes 
"Fisheries -A Case Study of an Outcome' ( 1995) 25 VUWLR 219, 220-221; Report of Submissions: 
Crown Proposals for the Treaty of Waitangl Claims (Wellington, 1995) 20, 93; S Heremala and 
A Tunks 'The "lwl Status" Decision: Clash of Ethics In the Allocation of the Maori Fisheries 
Resource" ( 1996) 1 New Zealand Environmental Law Reporter 168-170. 
Crown and Maori representatives signed the Fisheries Deed of Settlement (the 'Sealords Deal") on 
23 September 1992. The Deed provides full and final settlement of all Maori fishing cla11ns under 
the Treaty of Waltangt. For further lnformatlon see J Munro 'The Treaty of Wattangl and the 
Sealord Deal" ( 1994) 24 VUWLR 389. 
The Talnul "Heads of Agreement" was signed In September 1994, and ratified by a postal ballot of 
Talnul people over the following months. The Talnul Deed of Settlement was agreed to 1n May 
1995. For more Information see R Mahula "Talnul: A Case Study of Direct Negotiations" ( 1995) 
25 VUWLR 157; I Macduff "Resources. Rights and Recognltlon: Negotiating History In 
Aotearoa/New Zealand" ( 1995) Cultural Survival Quarterly 30. 
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established for the process of negotiation between the Crown and Maori. Too often 
disputants4 focus on the outcomes they want from a negotiation. Disputants give 
inadequate consideration to the process that is to be followed during substantive 
negotiations. However, a flawed process detracts from the substantive outcome eventually 
reached by the parties. The inability to resolve process issues means that the substantive 
outcome is less satisfactory to the parties. 
The second concept that this paper discusses is culture. Culture has an integral effect 
on process and final outcome. Cultural differences have a role in causing process 
inadequacy. Other causes are apparent, such as power imbalances and lack of resources. 
However, this paper contends that cultural difference is the biggest cause of the inability 
to establish an adequate procedure for negotiation, because it inhibits the ability to 
communicate effectively. In discussing culture, this paper looks particularly at the lack 
of ability to communicate, which is exaggerated by cultural assumptions. 
In the last part of this paper, the author suggests some guidelines for Crown/Maori 
negotiations, with a particular focus on the establishment of an adequate procedure and 
the need for the parties to comprehend cultural differences. 
B The Context for Crown/Ma.ori Disputes 
Ownership and control of land and resources, and political power, are the main interests 
involved in Crown/Maori disputes. This is also the case in disputes with indigenous 
peoples and states worldwide. 
The dispossession of land and resources, breaking of traditional social structures and 
political alienation caused by former colonial powers has had severe effects on indigenous 
peoples, historically and in the modern world. "Colonised" indigenous peoples are among 
the poorest, unhealthiest, most incarcerated peoples in the world. The current 
governments of modern states have inherited the task of resolving these issues, as a 
result of the actions of their colonial predecessors. 
4 Any reference to the "parties" or "disputants" ls a reference to the Crown and Maori. 
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An anti-colonialist, anti-assimilationist trend has become apparent in recent yea
rs. There 
is a growing appreciation of the uniqueness of indigenous peoples and ethnic m
inorities. 
With this has come an awareness that the effects of dispossession subsist, and t
hat some 
action is required to put right the ambivalent position occupied by the worlds' in
digenous 
peoples. Indigenous peoples have forced governments to recognise these issues 
and enter 
negotiation by enforcing rights under treaties, legislation and through courts 
using the 
common law doctrines of aboriginal title and fiduciary duties. The relationship
 between 
the Crown and Maori is encapsulated in the Treaty of Waitangi. The Crown's 
historical 
breaches of the Treaty provide the basis for the disputes that currently
 require 
negotiation. 
Before discussing the process and culture issues of Crown/Maori negotiation
 in more 
detail, it is necessary to define and discuss some academic approaches to neg
otiation. 
WCA1D345 
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II DEFINITION OF NEGOTIATION 
A Characteristics 
Negotiation encompasses behaviour that is basic and neces
sary in human society. 
Negotiation is inherent in everyday activities, from deciding w
ho is going to use the 
bathroom first in the morning, to managing a workload with one
's employer. Negotiation 
is one method that humans use to resolve the myriad of dispu
tes that occur everyday. 
Negotiation is not confined to the small-scale dispute. Negotiatio
n takes place at national 
and international levels, between governments, non-governmenta
l groups, interest groups, 
corporates and other large-scale organisations representing a la
rge group of people with 
similar interests. Negotiation also occurs intra- and inter-cultu
rally, between or within 
groups with their own cultural backgrounds. Generally, the as
sumptions that different 
groups bring to a negotiation, whether those assumptions are co
nscious or unconscious, 
determines the make-up and outcome of the negotiation. 
With the growth of the "ADR movement" in the last 20 years.
5 a number of accepted 
definitions and models for negotiation exist. Two prominent auth
ors describe negotiation 
as follows: 6 
Negotiation Is a basic means of getting what you want from oth
ers. It Is a back-and-forth 
communication designed to reach an agreement when you an
d the other side have some 
Interests that are shared and others that are opposed. 
Negotiation is when two or more parties to a dispute commun
icate ideas, issues and 
emotions in an attempt to mutually agree to a solution for their
 problem. 
5 
6 
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"ADR" Is an acronym for "Alternative Dispute Resolution". Th
e term refers to a number of dispute 
resolution options that have become popular over the last few
 decades. as alternatives to lltigation 
and arbitration. These options include different types of neg
otiation, mediation, facilitation. and 
conciliation, within forums like community law centres, gover
nment organisations. the marae and 
so on. 
Fisher and Ury Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement w
ithout Giving In (Houghton Mlffln. 
Boston, 1981) page xl (Introduction). 
6 
The definition in the above paragraph is idealistic. The success
 of a negotiation depends 
on the personal attributes of those involved.
7 Disputants often do not successfully 
communicate ideas, issues or emotions. The communication b
etween disputants might 
not be "back-and-forth", but one-sided. An agreement might 
not be reached, or be as 
"mutual", in terms of being balanced and with equal input by
 the parties, as one (or 
several) of the disputants would wish. However, while idealisti
c, the above definition is 
helpful as a starting point for analysis. 
Some characteristics appear to be common throughout most 
examples of negotiation. 
Negotiation is described as being flexible, involving concession
s, and as preserving the 
relationship between the parties. 
1 Flexibility 
Flexibility is relevant in two respects. First, it allows the partie
s to deal with the dispute 
in any manner they wish. There are no rules or precedents for
 negotiation, except what 
are imposed by the parties and interested third parties.
8 The limits which the parties 
or third parties seek to impose, may be in the form of appeals t
o morals, values, norms, 
sanctions, tikanga, kawa and so on. Secondly, flexibility allows 
the parties to decide from 
an infinitesimal amount of outcomes, including recompense, rest
itution, revenge, violence, 
humiliation, conciliation, education and restructuring the relat
ionship. 
To assume that all negotiations are inherently flexible is to gen
eralise too far. A number 
of factors will determine the amount of flexibility apparent in t
he negotiation. Some of 
these factors are the nature of the dispute, the severity of the c
risis, and the balance, or 
imbalance of power between the parties. For example, the pos
session by one party, of 
7 
8 
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Even "success" Is a relative term, as the parties may measu
re success In different ways. For 
example. for one party. making the other side concede more
 ground than they wanted might be 
considered success. For another party. success may be merel
y talking to the other side or getting 
them to the table. 
Rules are also tmpllcttly imposed by the values and sanctions o
f the cultures/soclelles to which the 
disputants belong. 
7 
a strong bargaining position, will give that party a considerable degree of flexibili
ty. It has 
a comparatively wide range of options. In comparison, the other party has 
a weaker 
bargaining position, and consequently, less flexibility to order the process and 
outcome. 
Flexibility is often used to compare negotiation to state-sanctioned forms o
f dispute 
resolution, like litigation and arbitration. When compared against these formal
9 methods 
of dispute resolution, negotiation is more flexible because prima facie there are
 no rules 
or formalities in existence. 
The current Crown/Maori negotiations process
10 is an example of an inflexible process. 
The current process has been set by the Government and reflects the Gove
rnment's 
strong bargaining position, in comparison to Maori. There is little opportunity
 for Maori 
to negotiate for a different type of process. The process has been set by the Go
vernment 
and must be adhered to. 
2 Concessions 
Another characteristic of negotiation is that the parties will make concessions to
 mutually 
agree to a solution. This is an obvious point, considering that a dispute arises 
when the 
parties take different stances over a particular issue. It follows, that to make a
 mutually 
satisfactory resolution, the parties have to move away from their original positio
n. Again, 
this is a generalised point, as in some negotiations, the concessions may be co
mpletely 
made by one party, rather than both or all: 
11 
9 
10 
11 
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L!Ugatlon and arbitration are referred to as 'formal dispute resolution" m
ethods. because they 
Involve many formal!Ues and are constrained by state-sanctioned rules; fo
r example, the High 
Court's Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Discussed below. Part IV. 
Gulliver Disputes and Negotiations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective (Academ
ic Press, New York, 
1979) 5. 
8 
At least one party, but usually both. must move toward the other... . Although there
 may be a 
compromise of some sort. this ls not inevitable since one party may be Induced to move
 altogether 
to his opponent's position or, alternatively, there can be the Joint. integrative creation of
 something 
new that ls acceptable to both parties. 
In Crown/Maori negotiations, there tends to be a disproportionate number of concessions 
made by Maori. In the Fisheries settlement, Maori "agreed"
12 to the following 
concessions: 
• the repeal of section 88(2) of the Fisheries Act 1983; 
• the promulgation of regulations governing non-commercial seafood rights; 
• endorsement of the Quota Management System by Maori; 
• discontinuance of High Court proceedings for which orders for injunctions still 
stood and an undertaking by Maori not to recommence any proceedings; 
• satisfaction of all current and future claims and extinguishment of all commercial 
fishing rights under statute, common law and the Treaty; and 
• non-commercial fishing rights not statutorily extinguished and still giving rise to 
Treaty obligations on behalf of the Crown, but having no legal effect against the 
Crown in the courts. 
12 
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Not all lwi agreed to. or signed the Fisheries Deed of Settlement. However. the Treaty o
f Waltangl 
(Fisheries Claims) Act 1992. which enacts the terms of the Deed. applies to all Maori. 
Therefore. 
non-signatory iwi were "drawn into' the Deed by the coercive legislation. 
9 
These concessions are considerable and reflect the imbalance in power between the 
Crown and Maori: 13 
There Is a basic Inequality of bargatntng power between the Crown and Maori. The Cro
wn wields 
control over the negotiation process; it has skilled and experienced advtsors and negot
iators; and 
it can, for the most part, pick when and on what terms It wants to negotiate, and whe
ther or not 
to settle. Maori are In a comparatively weak position. They have few human and
 financial 
resources; they cannot enter Into negotiations without a measure of political largesse or 
as a result 
of Judicial favour; and they are often unable to walk away from a settlement, either bec
ause their 
needs are pressing, or for fear that, without settlement, the Crown will act or omit to a
ct so as to 
prejudice Maori Interests. This power Imbalance can have a significant effect on outco
me: there 
can be no guarantee In such circumstances that Maori will regard any settlement r
eached as 
legitimate. 
3 Preserving the Relationship 
Another observation made about negotiation, is that it usually, (or at least, most 
successfully) takes place when the parties have a continuing relationship, and must 
maintain it. Negotiation will either resolve the dispute and allow the parties to continue 
their former interaction, or restructure the nature of the relationship, so that it persists 
in a different form. The Crown/Maori relationship has an added dimension. The Treaty 
of Waitangi provides the basis for the relationship between the Crown and Maori. This 
relationship will always exist by virtue of the Treaty.
14 However, the nature of the 
CrownJMaori relationship will change as every new generation reinterprets the 
relationship: 15 
13 
14 
15 
WCA1 D345 
J Munro, above n2. p397. 
This may be an Issue if New Zealand becomes a republic . However. it ls the author's vte
w that any 
new executive will have to Inherit the responslblllties of the Crown , Including the Crow
n's Treaty 
r esponsibilities. 
C Wickliffe "Issues for Indigenous Claims Settlement Pollcles Arising In Other Jurisdictio
ns" ( 1995) 
25 VUWLR 204. 214. 
10 
In the Fisheries Settlement Report [n Wai 307] the Waitangl Tribunal had no dou
bt that a 
settlement policy should be looking to the future rather than seeking the ext1ngu1shmen
t of rights 
or finalisation of the relationship that exists between Crown and Maori. In other word
s full and 
final settlements are Inconsistent with the ongoing nature of the partnership establish
ed by the 
Treaty. 
In comparison, adversarial forms of dispute resolution, primarily adjudication, tend to 
"pit" the parties against each other. This entrenching of positions and attitudes may work 
to destroy any relationship between the parties, if it has not already been destroyed. 
However, another analysis can be made. It is common for litigants to settle just before 
reaching the trial stage. Litigation is often used as a threat, to force disputants into 
negotiation. The same point can be made about Crown/Maori negotiations. Maori have 
used the courts to force the Crown into negotiations. The approach appears to have 
worked well for Maori and also overseas.
16 
B The Distinction Between Process and Substance 
The distinction between process and substance is used in the analysis of many 
disciplines. Although both elements are integral to each other the distinction is a useful 
tool for analysis. 
The substance of a negotiation is the actual communication that takes place between the 
parties: their arguments, conversations, discourse and actions. The substantive outcome 
of a negotiation is the final resolution that the parties reach. This is also referred to as 
the goal of the negotiation: the agreement that the parties are left with after the discourse 
has finished. Ideally, at the point the substantive outcome is reached, the dispute should 
be resolved. 
16 
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C Wickliffe Indigenous Claims and the Process of Negotiation and Settlement in Coun
tries with 
Jurisdictions and Populations Comparable to New Zealand's (Report prepared
 for the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment. Wellington. September 1994) 6. 8. 3
3-37. 
11 
The process of a negotiation can be described as the steps that the parties take in 
reaching the substantive outcome. Process is the method by which the parties go about 
resolving their dispute. Process can be analysed as the structure which is imposed upon 
the course of a negotiation. For example, disputing neighbours agree that they will meet 
in one person's home, to discuss who will be responsible for repairing the fence, and that 
they will do so in an amiable and reasonable manner. The disputing neighbours have 
established a process for their negotiation. They have identified a forum to negotiate in, 
the relevant issue, and a protocol for how they will treat each other. 
The outcome is usually of primary importance to the disputants. The theory in this paper 
is that process is just as important as outcome. Before discussing this in more detail, 
it is necessary to look at the effect of cultural differences on the process of Crown/Maori 
negotiations. 
WCA!D345 
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III THE EFFECT OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
A Analysis of Culture 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines culture as "the customs, civiliza
tion, and 
achievements of a particular time or people".
17 Another definition is "the totality of 
learned, socially transmitted behaviour". 
18 The one constant in a definition of culture 
is "people". It is people that create culture. A further delineation is "groups o
f people". 
Culture is created by groups of people, not individuals. A further requiremen
t is "time". 
A culture forms over a period of time, over which practices are learned, deve
loped and 
passed on to others. The next basic requirement for culture is a set of prac
tices and 
beliefs. Culture is a way of doing things. Over time, values attach to this wa
y of doing 
things. The attached values tell us that these cultural practices are acceptable,
 preferred 
and necessary ways of living our lives. 
Culture is an environmental constant, but the types of culture we are subjected
 to are not 
constant. We are subjected to different cultures by reason of our sex, 
race, age, 
nationality, place of residence, place of work and so on. Culture is an
 external 
phenomena which ultimately shapes our individual personalities. Culture, comb
ined with 
our individual personalities, gives us our identity. 
The different cultures of the Crown and Maori are discussed in this paper. Unfo
rtunately, 
assumptions often have to be made when discussing the cultures of large 
groups of 
people. This paper discusses "Maori culture", as opposed to specific iwi or hapu
 cultures. 
As many tikanga are common across iwi and hapu boundaries, it is convenient 
to discuss 
Maori, rather than iwi culture. However, the independence of iwi/hapu cultur
es should 
not be underestimated. Nor should the influence of individual personalities on
 iwi/hapu 
17 
18 
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RE Allen (ed) Concise Oxford Dictionary (Bed . Oxford University Press. 199
0). 
JA Axelson Counsellng and Development In a Multicultural Society (Bro
oks/Cole Publishing 
Company. California. 1993) 3. 
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cultures be forgotten. A similar caveat must be applied when discussing "Pakeha culture". 
The term "Pakeha culture" in this paper means the culture of the mainstream, dominant 
Caucasian population. 
Comparing Pakeha culture to Maori culture in a discussion on Treaty negotiations is 
dangerous because the parties to Treaty negotiations are Maori and the "Crown", not 
"Pakeha" generally. The obvious question is whether there is a Crown or Government 
culture that would be better used for this discussion. The Crown is an artificial, 
constitutional construct. It would be false to say there is a "Crown culture" evident in 
New Zealand. However, there is what might be called a Government subculture, and 
more generally, a political culture. There is a Government subculture because the 
Government operates according to the mores that it, and its National predecessors have 
established as acceptable, preferred ways of doing things. 
This is a subculture because it feeds off the majority, mainstream, Pakeha culture. The 
majority of Government members are middle-class Pakeha men. It makes sense that the 
broader cultural grouping (Pakeha) affects any subcultures and therefore, the 
Government's subculture has its basis in Pakeha culture. The political system itself 
reflects Pakeha culture. The Government represents the majority of the electorate, 70% 
of which is Pakeha. Therefore, for political reasons alone, the Government will reflect 
Pakeha culture. It follows that Pakeha culture is the correct entity for comparison to 
Maori culture in this paper. 
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B Misunderstanding through Miscommunication 
Cultural differences are the biggest cause of the inability to establish an adequate 
negotiation procedure. It is not the differences in themselves that cause the difficulties. 
It is the fact that groups cannot communicate their differences that causes the failure. 
Communication is most commonly impeded by the inability of the parties to truly listen 
to each other. Hearing what the other side says is impeded by much more than language 
constraints. Ethnocentrism, prejudice, racism, stereotyping, patronism and the making 
of assumptions generally are faults that all contribute to bad communication. and 
ultimately, ineffective procedural and substantive negotiation. 
The introduction of the current process and the Crown proposals
19 by the Government 
is an example of an overt lack of communication. The Government simply failed to 
involve Maori in the creation of the any process policy. It is also an example of how the 
Government assumes it can set settlement policy by itself. The reason for this assumption 
is the Government's political and constitutional position. Its powerful position gives 
legitimacy to any assumptions it makes about the groups it governs. However, such 
assumptions are not necessarily legitimate from a Maori point of view. It is generally true 
that Maori do not feel that the Government can legitimately make assumptions about 
settlements policy. 
Furthermore, the differences in culture impact on the way that the parties view the issues 
and objectives. It impacts on the forum and protocols that each party finds acceptable. 
Culture determines the way each party handles internal matters. Disputants make 
assumptions about each other based on their own cultural biases . All of these situations 
lead to misunderstanding because differences are not discussed or understood. 
19 Discussed in par t rv below. 
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C Conceptual Framework of Culture and Negotiation 
The previous section (IIIB) identifies the impact that culture has on disputing. It is 
possible to turn the analysis around. Disputing in itself is a cultural behaviour. The 
dispute itself might determine the way a party reacts to another. 
In Crown/Maori disputes and negotiations, there is the potential for the creation of a 
"negotiation" subculture. There already seems to be some patterns in the way in which 
previous Crown/Maori negotiations have been structured. For example, the Crown always 
sets the process; huge concessions always seem to be made by Maori; Maori have to force 
the Crown into negotiation through litigation, and so on. It appears that certain patterns 
of behaviour in Crown/Maori disputes are repeating. It would be unacceptable for a 
culture of Crown/Maori negotiations to be created on this basis. Crown/Maori negotiations 
are marked by a huge imbalance of power in favour of the Crown, and any formation of 
cultural practices on this basis would inherently reflect this unfair situation. 
Furthermore, process issues are simply not given enough consideration in current 
negotiations. The parties need to develop new cultural practices and values that recognise 
the importance of process in Crown/Maori negotiations. As a development of this idea, the 
inadequacies of the current and proposed methods for negotiation are discussed in the 
following parts. 
WCA1D345 
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IV CURRENT POLICY AND THE PROPOSALS 
A The Current Process 
The current process for negotiations between the Crown and Maori was established in 
1990.20 The current process has four stages:
21 
• acceptance onto a negotiations register; 
• negotiation of a framework agreement; 
• negotiation of an agreement In principle; 
• finalisation of a detailed agreement. 
It is unclear how successful the current process has been. Only two major settlements 
have been made since 1990. It does not appear that the Fisheries settlement was 
negotiated on the 1990 model. The Fisheries negotiations took place over only a few days, 
in secret, and under a commercial deadline. The process in the Fisheries settlement was 
driven by commercial imperative (the sale of the Sealords group of companies by Carter 
Holt Harvey Limited) and the ensuing lack of time.22 There does not appear to have been 
any time to sort out process issues, given these constraints. 
20 The Direct Negotiation of Maori Claims (Wellington , 1990). 
21 Proposals. below n25. p30. 
22 J Munro, above n2, p408. 
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The Tainui settlement seems to have been negotiated on yet a different model. Robert 
Mahuta23 identifies three phases in the process of the Tainui negotiations: 
Phase 1 requires the Crown and Tainul in this case to engage In preliminary discussions
 to ensure 
that the nature of the cla!m Is fully understood. In this Instance. the report of the S
im Royal 
Commission and Manukau Report of the Wa!tangl Tribunal clearly established the nat
ure of the 
raupatu cla!m. 
Phase 2 requires the development of a Crown position and brief for negotiations. Unti
l recently, 
no position was conveyed by the Crown to Talnul. The December release of the Crow
n's policy 
proposal on the settlement of Maori claims came well after negotiations commenced an
d a likely 
settlement package had been considered. To this extent Talnul was operating on the orig
inal basis 
of land for land (accepting the Crown's land holdings of 90,000 acres as the 'peg In the
 ground") . 
No natural resource pol1cy had been mentioned: nor was "full and final' settlement cons
idered an 
Issue. 
Phase 3 involved the negotiations themselves. What Talnul has found as the Hnch pin to
 effectively 
participate in this process Is to do the home work. and to be better than the Crown in a
ll aspects 
of the process. Handicapped by Hmlted resources and concerned with Its obligations to 
Its people. 
achieving this was difficult. 
None of these three phrases specifically involves sorting out process issues. It looks as 
if process issues were mixed into phases two and three with the negotiation itself. The 
difficulties are acknowledged in the above quote. The Crown did not initially communicate 
its position to the Tainui negotiators; the new Crown proposals
24 were released when the 
negotiations were already underway; some interests (natural resources, full and final 
settlement) had not been discussed; and Tainui lacked resources for process issues. The 
thesis of this paper is that process issues must be negotiated before substantive 
negotiation takes place. It is important that process issues are resolved so that they do 
not interrupt the negotiation of substantive issues, and so that the outcome is not 
hampered by dissatisfaction over the process. 
23 R Mahula, above n3, ppl 71-173. 
24 See the following paragraphs in Part !VB. 
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B The Crown Proposals 
The Government has proposed a new settlements policy.
25 The Crown proposals contain 
the Government's policy on the fiscal envelope, claims affecting the conservation estate, 
natural resources and gifted lands the negotiation process, Maori/iwi representation, the 
legal structure of claimant groups, and finality of settlements. Maori have heavily 
cr iticised the proposals since their release.
26 
The proposed negotiations process is set out in Part 5 of the Crown proposals. The 
process is as follows: 27 
25 
26 
27 
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The Crown proposes four main stages In the negotiations process: 
•acceptance onto a Negotiations Work Programme; 
• negotiating redress for the breach. leading to a draft Deed of Settlement; 
• ratification of settlement by the Crown and claimants. leadlng to the signing of a Deed
 
of Settlement; 
• implementation of settlement. 
The Crown proposes that acceptance onto the Negotiations Work Programme will require
 the Crown 
to: 
•accept that the historical basis for the claim has been determlned; 
•agree to a Crown position on the nature and extent of each of the alleged breaches; 
•accept that the correct claimant grouptng has been identified for the claim; 
•accept that the claimant negotiators have been properly mandated by the claimant
 
group; 
•agree that the claim has sufficient priority to be Included on the Negotiations Work
 
Programme, ln terms of the Governments's overall settlement strategy, given resource and
 
financial constraints. 
Office of Treaty Settlements Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty of Waltang
i Claims: 
Summary/Nga Kaupapa d te Karauna hei Whakatau i ngd Kereme o te Tirltl o Waita
ngi: He 
Whakardpopototanga and Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty of Waitang
i Claims: 
Detailed Proposals ("Crown proposals") (Wellington, 1994). 
T Ranglheuea "The Role of Maori Women In Treaty Negotiations and Settlements" (
 1995) 25 
VUWLR 195; I Macduff. above n3; Report of Submissions. above n l; M Durie "Proceeding
s of a Hui 
held at Hlrangl Marae, Turangl" ( 1995) 25 VUWLR 109. 
26 26 
Proposals. above n25, pp29-30. 
19 
The Crown proposes that acceptance onto the Negotiations Work Programme will also be 
conditional upon the clalmanls: 
•agreeing to negotiate a final settlement covering all of their claims unless the Crown 
makes an explicit exception; 
•agreeing to negotiate knowing that the Crown's offer of redress will be based on the 
Crown's stated position on the nature and extent of the breach. despite the fact that the 
claim may include alleged breached that are wider In nature and extent than those 
acknowledged by the Crown; 
•agreeing to waive all other avenues of redress that may be available to them while In 
negotiations; 
•acknowledging that a Crown condition of settlement will be the lifting of all memorials 
In the area, and other requlremenls to ensure finality. 
The Crown proposes that the clalmanls' agreement to these conditions will be signified In a written 
record, to be subsequently referred to as the "Terms of Negotiation". 
The Crown proposes that, after "without-prejudice" discussions with the cla!manls, It will develop 
a Crown negotiating brief for the claim before negotiations commence. The brief will establish the 
Crown's negotiation structure and specify procedures for consulting with third parties where they 
may be affected by a proposed settlement. 
If Crown and cla!manls reach agreement. the Crown proposes that the cla!manls will ratify a draft 
Deed of Settlement and endorse proposals on how the beneflls of settlement will be distributed and 
the resources managed. A final Deed of Settlement will not be signed, and therefore not be binding. 
until 1t has been ratified by both parties. 
The Government claims that the proposals are an improvement on the current process.
28 
However, the Crown created the proposals without any negotiation or consultation with 
Maori. The purpose of this paper is to show that preliminary negotiation is required 
between disputing parties, so that they establish a process together. The parties may have 
different conceptions of the process issues. If the Crown sets the process without input 
from Maori, then Maori are denied the opportunity to voice their ideas of the process 
issues. This may result in process issues being mixed into the discussion of substantive 
28 Proposals, above n25, p30. 
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issues, because they have not yet been adequately addressed. The long term result is 
dissatisfaction with the negotiations and the outcome, if a settlement is eventually reached. 
Dissatisfaction is incompatible with a settlement that is intended to be binding, lasting and 
mutually satisfying. 
Furthermore, the current policy and the Crown proposals are based on the premise that 
one process can be set up for every negotiation that is to follow. The approach in this 
paper is that a new process should be negotiated every time the Crown and an iwi or hapu 
enter settlement negotiations. It is obvious that a process set by the Crown will not 
necessarily suit iwi or hapu. Similarly, the right process for one iwi or hapu, might not 
suit another iwi or hapu. Therefore, process issues should be newly addressed at each 
negotiation. It would be wrong to assume that a precedent structure can be imposed 
equally on all Maori who enter negotiations with the Crown. Each iwi/hapu must be 
allowed to exercise their own rangatiratanga and tikanga in respect of these process 
issues. 
Another disadvantage of the current process and the Crown proposals is that the Crown 
has the power to "name" the parties to a negotiation. It is the Crown's policy to only 
negotiate with those it identifies, and the initiation of negotiation is dependent on the 
Crown. The Crown and Maori occupy the positions of "patron" and "supplicant" 
respectively. This exacerbates the imbalance of power that exists between the parties. 
The Crown's ability to pick who, where and when it negotiates, emphasises its dominance 
of Crown/Maori disputes. There is a distinct disadvantage for Maori in having this 
"patron/supplicant" relationship. Maori always have to be identified by the Crown. This 
is disadvantageous, because it emphasises the fact that the Crown is in charge and holds 
the greatest share of power. 
The current process and the Crown proposals need revision. Part V of this paper provides 
more detailed thought on the revision of the Crown/Maori negotiation process. 
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V ISSUES IN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION 
Disputants do not always give full consideration to a process before entering negotiations. 
Gulliver notes that the pre-bargaining phase has not yet been seen as important:
29 
This has meant a gross neglect of the wider processes and the dynamics of negotiations - a 
disregard for factors of cruclal lmportance to the end game of bargaining. If. however. we are to 
understand real-life negotiations. it is essential to investigate how the parties actually get to that end 
game. This requires examination of the interconnected processes of information exchange. learning 
and the recurrent adjustments of expectations and strategies. 
Because Crown/Maori negotiations involve many complex issues and are political and 
emotive, negotiating without a firm structure in place can lead to serious 
misunderstandings about issues and objectives. 
The inability to resolve these process issues means that the final outcome is less 
satisfactory. A flawed process detracts from the substantive outcome reached. Therefore 
the situation becomes one of "dispute processing'' (changing the form of the conflict and 
only prolonging it) rather than dispute resolution proper.
30 Therefore, to achieve an 
outcome that is acceptable to all involved, a process must be established and followed. 
The Fisheries settlement is an example where there is dissatisfaction with the outcome 
because the process was dissatisfactory. Since the Deed's signing there has been much 
dissent and litigation. In the Court of Appeal, 31 Maori appellants complained that the 
Deed was a settlement on behalf of all Maori, when many iwi were not represented or even 
in concurrence with the deal. They also complained about the settlement's permanence 
and the fact that Treaty rights were extinguished, a concept that is preposterous to many 
29 Gulliver. n 11, p73. 
30 SE Merry "Disputing without culture' (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 2057. 
31 Te Runanga o Wharekaurl Rekohu v Attorney-General 119921 2 NZLR 301. 
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Maori. A claim was also made to the Waitangi Tribunal.
32 Recent debate centres around 
the allocation of the fisheries resource by Te Ohu Kai Moana (the Treaty of Waitangi 
Fisheries Commission), and it has been pointed out that:
33 
... the Ideological dispute between lw1 based claimants and the Crown about what extent of the 
fishery Maori 'control" has merely been transferred to the TOKM forum. 
The conclusion is that, in relation to the Fisheries settlement, the Crown and Maori have 
undertaken "dispute processing''34 rather than dispute resolution. 
An acceptable process is of the utmost importance in Crown/Maori negotiations because 
the negotiators are acting with the interested and critical electorate and iwi watching 
closely. On either side, the negotiators represent the interests of an extremely large group 
of people with many divergent opinions. Each person has an interest in the negotiation. 
Therefore, to ensure that the electorate and iwi/hapu are satisfied with the course of the 
negotiation and the outcome, it is essential that the process taken is seen as fair and 
accessible. This political factor, the need to be seen as doing things right, is one that is 
absent from negotiations involving individuals, family members or business groups. 
A Preliminary steps to reaching a process 
With a focus on process, as opposed to outcome, it becomes apparent that many of the 
issues surrounding Crown/Maori negotiations occur before any "negotiation" proper takes 
place. Defining a process is a preliminary step to substantive negotiation, and, there are 
preliminary organisational steps before a process can be defined. These are discussed 
below. 
32 
33 
34 
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SE Merry, above n30. 
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1 Acknowledge the dispute, negotiation, parties 
Before the parties can decide upon any matter, they must agree that there is in fact a 
dispute. They must also realise that negotiation of the dispute is necessary. At this 
preliminary stage, there may only be an informal indication by both sides that the 
differences need sorting out. There may be a recognition that talking, an airing of 
grievances is required, with an unspoken or unconscious desire for resolution. The 
parties, especially in a small-scale "neighbourhood" dispute, would probably not even use 
the formal language of negotiation to describe their intentions. 
To recognise that a dispute exists, means that at least two parties are identifiable to each 
other. In Crown/Maori disputes it is easy for iwi to identify its opposing disputant. In all 
cases, it will be the "Crown" as represented by the relevant government. However, it is 
harder for the Crown to recognise its opposition. Some disputes involving the Crown and 
Maori, and concerning land or resources, are extremely complex, with large numbers of 
claimants and cross-claimants to the Waitangi Tribunal. It would be completely 
irresponsible for Crown/Maori negotiations to be undertaken there are a large number of 
cross-claimants and the interests are conflicting. The danger is that, in identifying a party 
or parties to negotiate with, where the right to claim resources amongst iwi/hapu is 
contested, marginalisation of other interested but excluded groups will occur. The effect 
of such marginalisation is two-fold. First, it offends all notions of fairness, mana and 
rangatiratanga to exclude interested parties from negotiations involving resources to which 
they have an entitlement. 
Furthermore, the legitimacy of any substantive outcome that does not include all rightful 
disputants will be questioned by those excluded. There are many examples in New 
Zealand, where the Maori Land Court, government commissions, or government officials 
have made arbitrary assessments as to which iwi or hapu are interested in disputed lands 
and resources. These settlements are constantly contested. It is apparent that revisiting 
and renegotiation of many disputes is necessary. The cost of revisiting settlements in 
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terms of finance and resources is extensive and can be avoided if some care is taken 
when identifying disputants. Also wasted is the cost in human terms, due to the distress, 
despair and angst caused by dispossession and the disallowance to assert mana over 
resources. 
In summary, it is contended that identification of a dispute and the disputants is the most 
important initial step in setting up a process for negotiation. This is especially the case 
in Crown/Maori negotiations where the disputes are complex and the parties not always 
easily identifiable. 
2 Intra-party negotiation and identification 
At the initial stage, the parties must recognise that they have a dispute. They must 
recognise that the other party is the proper group with which to enter a negotiation, and 
they must agree that some negotiation towards resolution is needed. In fact, the parties 
must agree that resolution is desired, rather than prolonging the dispute. There must also 
be some recognition of the importance of negotiating a process, before substantive 
negotiation for settlement takes place. 
At the next stage, or while the initial recognition is taking place, the parties must turn 
their focus inwards.35 Each party must be able to identify who it represents, and who 
will be its representatives. There must be intra-party consensus on the issues and 
arguments it wishes to make, and identification of the tactics and bargaining stance it will 
use. Each of these issues is addressed separately below. 
35 R Mahula. above n3 . ppl 73- 174. 
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(a) Representation 
For the Crown, identification of the appropriate negotiators is easy as the positions are 
occupied by the relevant Ministers (usually the Minister in Charge of Treaty Negotiations) 
with the assistance of other public servants and officials. Accordingly, there is no need 
for a mandate of the Crown's negotiators as they are acceptable due to their office. 
The appointment of negotiators for Maori is much more complex. Generally, it is the 
people who are perceived as being iwi leaders who obtain negotiator's positions. However, 
there is no consistency in the methods by which negotiators have come to represent 
certain iwi. It appears that negotiators of this decade have obtained their positions 
because they are well-known, move in political circles and are public figures. The phrase 
"the brown table" has recently become popular as a disparaging description of this group. 
Whether or not the criticism is unfair, it is to be expected considering that most public 
figures are criticised by those they represent. It does show there is some gap between 
iwi/hapo. members and those that lead and negotiate on their behalf. It also shows that 
there is some conflict amongst the people about "who" is truly acting in the interests of
 
iwi/hapu. There sometimes seems to be a clash in idealogies between those who negotiate 
and those who are represented:
36 
36 
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For a number of reasons. certain Maori leaders from various tribes In New Zealand hav
e assumed 
major positions of Influence and have been Identified as key representatives of Maorl
dom. This 
leadership has come under Increasing attack In recent times... . This controversy 
over Maori 
leadership has major ramifications for the effective negotiation and settlement of Maor
i claims. It 
therefore impacts on the certainty and durability of the negotiation and settlement proces
s. and thus 
has consequences for the ... outcomes that may be achieved . 
C Wickliffe, above n 16. p93 . 
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Modern structures exist through which appropriate leaders can be chosen by the iwi:
37 
A number of options are already available through which claimant representation can be 
determined: 
- voluntary resolution; 
- section 30 of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993; 
- section 6A of the Treaty of Waltangl Act 1975; 
- legislated settlements. 
It has been suggested that the only way to adequately find representatives for negotiations 
is to conduct a poll or vote of all identifiable iwi/hapu members:
38 
A reasonable and fair method to establish representative capacity and a conclusive mandate to 
settle Is needed. This may require conducting a poll of all Identifiable members of a whanau. hapil 
or lwt requesting their views on who has the right to represent all their Interests In negotiation 
Including the right to settle all their claims. Alternatively, as In Canada, It may require a vote of all 
affected Identifiable members. The vote would ratify and authorise the finalisation of a settlement 
option. The question of capacity to settle Is a very real problem for the Crown , and It Is an Issue 
that the Crown must address 1f good outcomes are to be achieved and 1f all Interests are to be dealt 
with equitably. 
This would be a difficult and expensive task, but not necessarily impossible. 
(b) Interests and desired outcomes 
Each party must identify its interests and what outcome it seeks from a negotiation 
resolving the dispute. It is the main contention of this paper that too much focus is placed 
on outcome, with only a cursory examination of procedural issues. At a procedural level, 
it is important for each party to define its desired outcome so that they have some 
incentive to progress forward. It is important for parties to agree internally on what is 
desired. The appearance of different goals and interests within one party, can create 
37 Proposals. above n25; p33. 
38 C Wickliffe. above n 16, p93. 
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factions, especially if the negotiation is already underway. Factionalisation may be worse 
where the negotiations have concluded, and it becomes apparent that what some members 
thought would be the outcome, is different from the actual outcome. 
In Crown/Maori negotiations, the interests negotiated for on each side are slightly different. 
In particular, Maori claims for resources and land are overlain with a desire for political 
power and autonomy, which is not acknowledged by the Crown:
39 
Maori have rejected the fiscal envelope as a legitimate settlement model prlmarlly because there Is 
no recognition of our Uno rangatlratanga. The fiscal envelope Is a red herring - the main Issue for 
Maori ls absolute sovereignty - the ability to manage our own affairs. 
It is also contended that Maori have interests that are unconsciously non-negotiable, 
causing some conflict of what interests are in fact negotiable and can be conceded.
40 If 
there are rights that Maori believe could never be extinguished, then the Crown is off-track 
in demanding extinguishment of these rights for full and final settlements. 
There are also issues about the interests that the Crown represents. It is unclear whether 
Crown negotiators represent only the Crown or also other third parties, like industrial and 
environmental interest groups. It may be that interest groups have legal, moral or political 
rights to be consulted or informed of aspects of Crown/Maori negotiations. It is less clear 
whether such interest groups have a right to be involved in the negotiations. It is the 
writer's belief that they do not. Interest groups have considerable political power, through 
lobbying and the media. Interest groups are inherently represented by the government, 
because any matter that will attract or lose votes will get political attention. Interest 
groups do seem to capture the sympathies of a significant part of the voting public. 
Unfortunately, many interest groups tend to manipulate and encourage the fears and 
ignorance of "white" New Zealand. It follows that the Crown's interests are shaped by 
practical, political concerns. 
39 T Ranglheuea, above n26; see also I Macduff, above n3 . 
40 J Munro, above n2. 416-417; I Macduff, above n3. 
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(c) Issues 
It is also necessary for both parties to define the substantive and process issues. This is 
a necessary step towards the identification of a party's interests, and will give guidance for 
the formulation of an outcome. It is necessary for each party to have the issues clear 
because it may become apparent that each side conceives the issues differently. 
(d) Deciding on tactics 
A party must decide what bargaining tactics it will use in the negotiations to follow. It can 
decide to be confrontational, concessionary, indignant or conciliatory. There is no limit 
to the stance a party takes. Bargaining tactics will be dictated to a large extent by a party's 
interests, the dispute, the respective strengths of each party and the personal attributes 
of the negotiators. 
An important issue, that requires intra-party discussion before negotiation has started, is 
on what issues concessions can be made. A party must also decide on what issues it will 
not concede any ground. A party may have a degree of concessionary points between the 
two extremes. Unfortunately, this is an issue upon which there may be fierce 
disagreement within one party. For example, in an iwi, interests and opinions differ 
widely, especially on specific points. Accordingly, some iwi members may think it 
acceptable to concede a particular block of land, or ownership to a resource, or a 
particular Treaty, common law, or statutory right. Others may be completely opposed to 
making these concessions. 
While gaining agreement on these points is difficult enough at iwi level, it is much more 
complex at "pan-Maori" level. This is demonstrated aptly by the Fisheries settlement in 
which negotiators for Maori agreed to concede all Treaty, common law and statutory rights 
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to commercial fisheries and enforcement rights in respect of customary fishing (amongst 
other things). It has become apparent that this concession is simply not acceptable to a 
large proportion of Maori. 
Therefore, deciding tactics, concessions and non-negotiable issues is extremely important, 
and must be decided internally before any negotiation with the other party takes place. 
The risk of not sorting out these issues (as best as they possibly can be sorted out) is that 
members of one party will be dissatisfied, and through various means, call the resolution 
of the dispute into doubt. 
B Pre-substantive Negotiation 
In the previous part it was recognised that, before a process can be negotiated, the parties 
must take the preliminary steps of identifying the dispute, acknowledging the need for 
resolution, and the identity of each other, and focusing on achieving intra-party cohesion 
by addressing relevant internal issues first. 
Before substantive negotiation can take place, a preliminary negotiation must be entered 
with the purpose of establishing a process suitable to both parties. Process must be 
negotiated because it is not satisfactory for one party to set the process. Such an 
approach would allow that party to order the process in its favour, to the detriment of the 
other party. Ideally, the process should reflect a method that both parties feel comfortable 
in. The only instance where it may be suitable for one party to set the process is where 
there is a disparate imbalance in power between the parties. In this case, allowing the 
disadvantaged party to set the process may provide a "level disputing field" in which both 
parties start on an equal footing. The opposite has occurred between the Crown and 
Maori. The Crown has the greater share of power and has set the process, and now 
proposes a new process. 
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Because we place so much emphasis on what we want from the opposite party, there is 
often a single-minded focus on reaching the outcome. The objective is to reach a goal, to 
the detriment of what occurs along the way. This is particularly true of Crown/Maori 
negotiations, where there is an obsession with legal and constitutional issues and land and 
resource ownership. To create an ordered process is to bring order to the substantive 
negotiation and subsequently, the relationship itself. The next issue is to determine what 
elements the parties need to negotiate to establish a process. 
C Process Issues 
The following part identifies and analyses the issues that need to be negotiated before a 
process for substantive negotiation can be agreed upon by the parties. The issues 
discussed are, in the author's opinion, the most important. Neglect of these process 
issues could be damaging to the eventual outcome. However, it is acknowledged that other 
process issues could arise simply because every dispute is unique and, therefore, different 
issues are apparent. 
1 Issues 
Before entering any negotiation, each side must identify for itself, what it thinks the issues 
in the dispute are. At the preliminary level, where process is discussed, each side should 
present its view of the issues. This is of fundamental importance because the parties 
could enter a dispute with entirely different conceptions of the issues. A failure to address 
this difference will result in the parties "talking past each other", making the negotiation 
a waste of time. 
It would be a rare occasion where the parties agree on the issues. The parties are 
disputing because they have differing views over some point. Because the stand-points are 
different, the conceptualisation of the issues will be different. Cultural differences add one 
more layer of distortion to the manner in which the parties view the issues. 
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The issues may also be viewed differently by degree. One party may focus on the broader, 
conceptual issues, and the other party may focus on the specific problems. For example, 
for Maori, the prime issue may be whether constitutional recognition should be given for 
the "wrongs" committed historically. The Crown may regard the fundamental issue as 
being whether a particular resource can be returned to Maori ownership and/or control. 
It would be patronizing to suggest that the parties are so unsophisticated as to have only 
one or two narrow issues in mind. It is expected that each party will have conceptualised 
a range of issues, from the broad to the narrow and from different viewpoints. What is 
important is how each party's issues match up to the other's. It may be that Maori have 
some issues in mind that are not apparent to the Crown, (and vice versa). Identifying that 
this is the case will lead the parties to understand that there are differences in the way 
that each disputant views the problems between them. Identifying an "issue" for one party 
where the other sees no issue, allows the parties to discuss whether this problem is one 
that needs addressing or not. It prevents misunderstanding later on in the substantive 
negotiation where one party may feel as if its concerns have not been considered or taken 
seriously by the other side. Alternatively, one party may feel that the other is distracted 
with cursory or side issues that are irrelevant, misunderstanding the importance with 
which the opponent considers the issue. 
Identifying and matching up the issues thought of by both sides should also provide the 
parties with a chance to reflect on the underlying messages in the other party's stance. 
The parties should ask why a particular issue is so important to the other, when it 
considered the issue to be irrelevant. Similarly, what does it say about their relationship 
that the parties can agree that A, B, Care important issues, but then disagree on X, Y and 
Z? The parties must ask themselves what kinds of values, principles and concepts lie 
behind the conceptualisation of certain issues. 
Advocating this type of reflective questioning is an attempt to suggest that the parties 
should try to understand where the other side comes from. This is procedural because 
if greater understanding is reached, communication will be less restricted and 
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misunderstood. Therefore, the process will be enhanced, leading to a more satisfactory 
outcome. This reflective exercise can also be undertaken when the parties identify or 
reveal their objectives for negotiating, discussed below. 
In summary, the parties need to identify the issues that they wish to discuss in the 
substantive negotiation. At this preliminary stage, no discussion is needed of the 
substantive problem - just an identification of the problems that will be the focus of the 
discussion to follow. In undertaking this task, each party should also take the opportunity 
to reach a better understanding of the other, by making an analysis of why certain issues 
are important, and others not. This stage will also reveal where the parties view issues 
differently, or not at all, from the other side. Revealing these gaps at this preliminary 
stage will prevent the parties from talking past each other, because of different and 
misunderstood problems. 
2 Objectives 
In a vein similar to mutual identification of issues, the parties must identify what 
objectives govern the course of the negotiations. This will consist of discussing what each 
party desires from the negotiation. Again, similar to the discussion on issues (above). the 
parties' objectives may be defined broadly or narrowly. Identifying these objectives should 
assist the parties to see differences in opinion before entering substantive negotiation, and 
thus, assist communication by preventing misunderstanding. 
It is obvious that the closer the parties' objectives correlate, the more incentive and reason 
there will be for reaching a mutually satisfying and beneficial outcome. However, the 
parties' objectives can never be 100% the same, as such a situation would lead to the 
logical conclusion that no dispute exists at all, denying the need for negotiation. It is much 
more likely that the parties agree on broad objectives, but not on the detailed options. For 
example, Crown and iwi might agree that the fundamental objective for negotiation is to 
provide redress for past wrongs and promote a relationship acknowledging respect and 
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consideration for the Treaty "partnership". However, it is very likely they will disagree on 
the detailed objectives: the kind of compensation, the quantum of compensation, 
particular resources and so on. 
It may be possible for objectives to differ at the broad level, without causing disruption to 
the substantive negotiation itself. For example, the broad iwi objective may be to obtain 
economic independence by exploiting a diverse and sufficient resource base. The broad 
Crown objective may be to settle the dispute to obtain political stability. The objectives 
differ, but are not mutually exclusive. 
Upon learning the other side's objectives, the parties again have the chance to analyse the 
stance taken. A disputant must ask "why" a particular objective is important. What does 
it signal about the other party's values, view of the dispute and so on? 
Identifying the objectives desired and the reasons for them, will enable the parties to set 
out roughly what they hope to achieve by the end of the substantive negotiation. However, 
the author is not contending that the issues to be discussed and objectives to be gained 
should be inflexibly set in a process and adhered to throughout the substantive 
discussions. There must be some flexibility to allow for the fact that different, perhaps 
better, issues and objectives may become apparent only on the discussion of substantive 
points. It would be ideal if all issues and objectives could be identified first at a 
preliminary procedural stage, as the appearance of new material at a later stage may only 
confuse, cause misunderstanding, or give the impression to others outside the immediate 
discussions that the negotiation is going "off-track". This is the reason it is contended that 
all issues and objectives should be identified as far as possible at a preliminary level. 
However, it is recognised that no matter how well prepared the parties are procedurally, 
new matters may arise. A combination of strong procedural preparation and the ability 
to be flexible enough to allow some changes to the procedure already established, should 
allow the parties to deal with their situation adequately. 
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3 Forum and Timing 
Working out the forum for the dispute and the time constraints needs discussion. The 
preferences that each party may have in respect of forum and timing will be heavily 
influenced by their respective cultural backgrounds. 
Time is a concept which is viewed differently amongst many cultures. In European or 
"Western" cultures, time is a constraint, and something that must be worked within 
strictly. Examples of this concept of time are readily available. "Time is of the essence" 
is a commercial phrase that is used and drafted into contracts. It means that the time and 
date constraints set out in the contract must be adhered to strictly. 
The current Government places much political significance on time, as shown by its 
announcement in December 1994 that its policy is to resolve all Treaty of Waitangi claims 
by the year 2000. This policy is an attempt to placate voters who are nervous and 
perhaps ignorant about the effect Maori claims have on them individually. This shows 
that there is a fear that a dispute will drag on and therefore, a considerable amount of 
time will be wasted. Related to this is the importance, especially in "business" culture, of 
the concept of "certainty". Certainty, or the lack of it, is essential in business. Investors 
want to be assured of certainty before they spend. The current Government is keen to 
keep attracting foreign investment in New Zealand. To do so, the Government must try 
to diminish the uncertainty caused by Treaty claims. One of the factors causing 
uncertainty is the unpredictability of the claims in respect of time. Placating foreign 
investors is perhaps a better rationale for the Government's announcement in 1994. 
In comparison, Maori have traditionally, and even in the modern world, viewed time very 
differently. Time is less of a restraint. Importance is placed on what people feel they need 
to say, that they have an opportunity to do so, and that the appropriate kawa and tikanga 
is followed throughout and completed. It is commonplace at hui for a timetable to be only 
roughly adhered to. It would be insulting to interrupt a speaker (whether on the paepae 
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or not) or hurry a person along, simply because the next item on the agenda needs 
discussion. Speakers will only be interrupted in the most extreme situations; for example, 
where tikanga has been breached. 
The phrase "Maori time" has been coined to describe this disregard for time constraints. 
It is used rather disparagingly and is considered to be racist as it has connotations of 
Maori being slow, unpunctual and lazy. However, a revisionist approach could interpret 
the phrase in a positive light. It describes the Maori refusal to be constrained by an 
artificial construct, with the main focus on people and what they have to say. There are 
exceptions. The structure of the modern world constrains every person in much the same 
way, as the working day has to be attended to, and the natural world is no longer the sole 
guide of time. 
Given that time is viewed so differently, discussion is needed amongst the parties to 
determine what rules can be applied. It is important that the parties resolve any timing 
issues at the procedural stage so there is no misunderstandings, with one party perhaps 
feeling rushed, or the other feeling that the process is too slow with nothing being 
achieved. 
Choosing an appropriate forum is another relevant issue. The most appropriate Maori 
forums for resolving disputes are the marae-atea and the wharenui. The wharenui and 
marae-atea are structured so that large groups of people can congregate, so that the entire 
whanau or hapu can be involved in any hui that takes place, whether that hui be for 
celebration, tangihanga, meeting or dispute resolution. As this is the forum that is most 
familiar to Maori, it is probable that most Maori would prefer negotiations with the Crown 
to be undertaken on the marae. 
Assuming that Crown negotiators are Pake ha, the most familiar forum for Crown 
negotiators is likely to be a boardroom, office of some other place of business. In Pakeha 
culture, choosing an appropriate forum depends entirely on the dispute. Accordingly, 
intimate, family disputes are considered to be more adequately dealt with in the home, or 
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if need be, in private family conferences or mediation facilitated by other third parties, like 
counsellors. In comparison, business disputes are dealt with in a business forum like a 
boardroom or office. In both forums, confidentiality can be kept. This displays the 
importance in Pakeha culture of having clear demarcations between private family life, 
public family life, business concerns and so on. There are appropriate forums for 
disputes in each of these area. 
The importance of environmental surroundings should not be underestimated. Negotiating 
in an environment that feels foreign can be intimidating and prevent a party from 
communicating clearly and effectively. Therefore, in Crown/Maori negotiations it would 
be ideal if a half-way solution was used, where negotiation took place on the marae and 
in the boardroom. 
There appear to be several reasons for why a boardroom approach might be favoured by 
Crown and Maori negotiators. All negotiations are confidential and not open to either the 
general public, members of the negotiating iwi, other Government officials, or interested 
third parties. The reasons for secrecy are commercial and political. In contrast, the 
marae is an open area where whanau and supporters are expected to attend. 
Confidentiality could not be kept on the marae. 
4 Protocol 
The parties must also decide in what manner they will present their arguments and the 
protocol with which they will treat each other. The parties must decide what language 
they will negotiate in. In New Zealand, the greater part of a negotiation will be in English, 
it being the common language. It is very unlikely that Crown negotiators have the ability 
to communicate in Maori. 
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A decision must be made as to what amount of tikanga attends the negotiation. Will the 
parties start with an appropriate karakia? Will the tikanga as to speaking, listening and 
not interrupting apply? Alternatively, the parties may set up, either formally or informally, 
an etiquette to apply to the negotiations. They may decide an order for speaking so that 
each side and person gets an opportunity to speak in turn. 
It is unclear what type of etiquette was applied in the settlements to date, as all 
proceedings were taken secretly and in confidence. 
5 Information Dissemination 
The dissemination of information can take place at two stages: first, during the course 
of the negotiations; secondly, after the dispute has been resolved. Several issues are 
apparent. Should information about the course of the negotiations, while they are still on, 
be disseminated, or will this endanger continuing negotiation? To whom should this 
information be disseminated? What information should be disseminated after the dispute 
is settled, how soon after, and to whom? 
The current procedure provides for all negotiations to be undertaken in confidence. Only 
the negotiators themselves are privy to what occurs at the substantive stage. There are 
several viable reasons for this approach. It allows the negotiators to do their jobs 
unhindered, without critical constituents and the public criticising tactics they perhaps 
do not fully understand. It prevents the media from completely sensationalising issues 
and misinforming the public. Unfortunately, this is commonplace in news items involving 
Treaty claims and Maori issues. 
However, the confidential approach does not accord with tikanga Maori. The resolution 
of a dispute involves every person affected, and whanau, hapu and iwi members are not 
excluded from attending hui. This is not just the case for disputes or issues involving all 
people. Even in disputes where an individual has been wronged, the entire whanau or 
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hapu has the right to claim redress against the whanau or hapu of the wrongdoer. This 
is because a "wrong'' or "hara" insults the mana of all, not just the individual. Accordingly, 
the entire group is affected and entitled to be present and have their say. 
However, a concession to tikanga on this point may not be practical, or even beneficial to 
anyone, given the diversity of interests within iwi, the commercial sensitivities and need 
to progress on a fairly tight timeframe. Unlike earlier times when Maori social structures 
were more cohesive, the interests of hapu and whanau members may differ widely. This 
may mean that dissemination may have to give way to confidentiality, where it is 
appropriate. However, negotiators should not withhold information that could be given 
to their people without affecting the settlement. This occurred in the Fisheries 
settlement: 41 
The Crown and the Maori negotiators declded ... to take the deal to national hul and some twenty-
three marae throughout the country for ratification. These hut became surrounded by considerable 
controversy. Maori, it was claimed, did not understand the full content and lmpllcations of the 
[deal]; there was no time for proper consideration; full and frank disclosures were not always made 
- some negotiators would not reveal the contents of the Memorandum [of Understanding] on the 
grounds of commercial sensitivity; lw! were not assisted by lawyers or financial advlsors; and no 
negative aspects of the deal were presented. 
Withholding information when it is supposed to be disseminated (for example, at hui) is 
simply not acceptable. The Crown and Maori negotiators need to decide how they will 
release information before they start substantive negotiations. 
41 J Munro. above n2. p408-409. 
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6 Summary of Part VC 
To establish an adequate negotiations process, the parties must undertake a large amount 
of preparatory work. The parties must acknowledge that they have a dispute that requires 
negotiation. They must also be able to adequately identify each other. This has been a 
problem in Crown/Maori disputes where it has sometimes been difficult for the Crown to 
identify the appropriate iwi with which to negotiate. 
Each party must undertake to resolve internal issues before attempting substantive 
negotiation. This involves each party discussing its representation issues, its interests, 
the issues it wants to negotiate on, its bargaining tactics and the forum it would prefer to 
be in. 
When internal issues have been sorted, the parties must enter a negotiation, for the 
purpose of establishing a process. In addition to identifying the substantive issues, 
objectives, forum, timing, protocol and information release, the parties should attempt to 
understand their opponent's cultural values and practices. The parties should only enter 
substantive negotiations when the process has been mutually established through this 
preliminary negotiation. 
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D Preparationfor Substantive Negotiation 
After the parties have agreed to the type of process they will follow, they should undertake 
further preparation before entering substantive negotiation. There may be further 
housekeeping matters that require attention. 
1 Further internal organisation 
Once the process is established, the negotiators must go back to their respective parties 
and discuss any further housekeeping, procedural or substantive issues that arise. The 
process negotiation may provide an opportunity for new issues to surface and these need 
internal discussion. 
The process that has been established may warrant a change in tactics or approach. 
Negotiators will have to ensure that they are familiar with the process they have agreed to, 
because aspects of the process may affect the way negotiators talk, argue, and present 
themselves. 
2 Substantive Negotiation 
It is only when the process has been established and internal matters are satisfactory, that 
the negotiators should undertake substantive negotiation. The negotiation of substantive 
issues should now be streamlined. The process will facilitate the negotiation so that main 
issues can be discussed, and not be mixed-up with procedural issues. 
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VI CONCLUSIONS 
The goal of this paper is to suggest some guidelines for the process of negotiations 
between the Crown and Maori. In Crown/Maori negotiations, there tends to be a focus on 
the legal and constitutional issues and the settlement outcomes. However, the parties 
need to focus more on process issues. This inability to resolve process issues means that 
the outcome is less satisfactory, which is demonstrated by the Fisheries settlement. A 
flawed process detracts from the substantive outcome reached. 
Ineffective communication is the cause of most process issues. Cultural differences cause 
ineffective communication. The reason for cultural misunderstanding is the inability to 
communicate differences and the inability to comprehend differences. Lack of an ability 
to communicate is exacerbated by racial and cultural assumptions and the fact that 
different substantive goals are envisaged by each party, but not understood. 
It is impossible to dispute without culture, it being a necessary context for each disputant. 
The parties must try to understand each other's culture and attempt to negotiate on 
understood ground. The only other option is to allow one party to override the cultural 
practices and interests of the other through greater power. This is the case in 
Crown/Maori negotiations where the Crown controls all aspects of the negotiation process 
because of the imbalance of power in its favour. 
Two stages in the establishment of a negotiations process have been identified in Parts VA, 
VB and VC of this paper. At the earliest stage, the parties must acknowledge that they 
have a dispute. They must recognise that negotiation is required. Furthermore, they must 
be able to identify one another. 
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At the next preparatory stage, the parties must each look at internal issues. Each party 
must discuss the following issues: 
• representation; 
• interests and desired outcomes; 
• issues for negotiation; 
• bargaining tactics; 
• forum for negotiation. 
When the parties have each sorted these internal issues, they must enter negotiations for 
the purpose of establishing a process. At this pre-substantive negotiation stage, the 
parties should try to resolve the following procedural issues: 
• issues for negotiation; 
• objectives of negotiating; 
• forum and timing; 
• protocol and etiquette; 
• information dissemination. 
When discussing the above issues, the parties should each consider how cultural values, 
ideals and practices are reflected in their opponent's conceptualization of the issues and 
objectives. In taking this step, the parties are making an effort to try to understand, or 
at least be aware of, their opponent's differences. This is necessary if the barriers 
imposed by cultural differences are to be broken down. It is hoped that this is a goal that 
both Crown and Maori will work towards achieving. 
Word count: 12 300 
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